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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Economie Reform in Russia*
Vladimir M. Kollontai**
Economic reform in Russia, as in all the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, is a rapidly changing topic. The proclaimed aims of reform are 
constantly revised. The political and social setting of government activ­
ities is evolving at a very fast pace. The practical economic situation, the 
main economic parameters are in permanent flux. In this lecture I will 
not try to keep up with the latest events but will focus attention on the 
longer-term fundamental issues.
A word of caution to begin with. In describing the situation in Russia 
and the other reforming countries we are using terminology, which in 
the West has concrete substance and more or less precise connotations. 
In relation to all the former socialist countries these same notions are 
often used, without specifying that they are applied to quite different 
phenomena. The reforming countries are post-totalitarian societies with­
out all the historical heritage of Western democracies. The heritage of 
a totalitarian society is very different and it makes itself felt in endless 
ways. In a totalitarian society most people are placed in a situation 
when their depressed basic needs are satisfied through this or that type 
of state distribution. At the same time they are practically uninvolved 
in any decision-making processes, be they at local or national levels. As 
a result in a post-totalitarian society the notion of democracy involun­
tarily carries a much larger element of demands towards the state and
I am very grateful to the European University Institute which gave me a possibility 
during several months to conduct studies and meet with a distinguished group of 
scholars. Without such an opportunity this lecture could not have appeared. My 
special thanks go to Stuart Holland, Emile Noel and Susan Strange, whose help in 
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much lesser elements of responsibility for the future of society. 
Demands for higher wages and more consumer goods are rampant; 
everyone wants to express himself and there is an abundance of political 
parties that have tremendous difficulties subordinating personal interests 
and ambitions to the needs of societal development. In the course of 
this lecture we will have to dwell rather often on the different content 
that similar terminology reflects in the context of Western countries and 
of reforming societies.
And one last introductory comment. I think it is important to mention 
some of the specific features of Russia. Everybody knows that it is a 
very large country and I will not take up time giving examples. What is 
important is to stress that due to this vastness it is a country prone to 
conservatism. Impulses for change (be they internal or external) most 
often get drowned in this great mass of territory and large but dispersed 
population. Historically most reform initiatives were first subdued by 
internal conservatism and later rejected by passive resistance and/or 
reactionary backlashes. Only a very small part of the intended changes 
survived. This was the fate of reforms initiated by Ivan the Terrible, 
Peter the Great, Alexander II, etc. The October Revolution made a 
somewhat bigger impact — for better or for worse — because of the 
barbarous methods employed. This historical heritage is deeply in­
grained in the people, in the culture and value systems and precondi­
tions a very skeptical and often wary attitude towards change (especially 
if initiated from above). Progressive change was usually advocated and 
hoped for by a relatively small part of society, the western oriented part 
of the intelligentsia.
Another feature of Russian development that needs special mention 
is the historically limited role of law in restricting the use of political 
power. In most cases this uncomfortable blend of conservatism and the 
lack of restriction on the powers-that-be tends to lead to sullen 
passiveness, to tolerance of existing ills, to wariness of change lest it 
brings even greater evils. In such an environment most movements for 
change took on very active, even desperate, uncompromising, extremist 
forms. Anything less was from the outset considered doomed to failure 
and oblivion. It is not by chance that the most prominent proponents of 
terrorism, anarchism, nihilism, bolshevism were Russians. Such trends 
historically have been especially prevalent among the educated 
intelligentsia. At the grassroots level something similar can be observed. 
As an antidote to unlimited central power the populace has evolved a 
complex unwritten code of moral justice and ethics which sets certain 
notions of tolerable and intolerable injustices. Beyond a certain limit 




























































































Extremist tendencies have become a part of the Russian character; 
compromises and gradualism are to a large extent alien to it. This intro­
duces a serious element of instability into society. Perestrojka, among 
other things was an attempt to change this situation. But deeply in­
grained features often continue to make themselves felt for a long time.
* * *
The world community suddenly has to face up to a new major chal­
lenge. As if the threats of nuclear destruction, the problems of deve­
loping countries, global environmental degradation were not enough, 
the events in Eastern Europe and the former USSR are raising new is­
sues. The essence of what is happening is a dangerous acceleration of 
the disintegration of the life support system in one sixth of the world.
As with all such major events, this one also has a long and painful 
history in the unsuccessful attempt by Russia to find a short-cut in 
overcoming underdevelopment. The historic events are well known. The 
establishment of a totalitarian regime, which took several generations 
to decay. Through central planning the regime imposed anti-market 
structures and institutions on the economy, substituted market forces by 
voluntaristic decisions. Resources were expropriated from many if not 
most economic fields with the expressed aim of concentrating them to 
solve a specific problem, deemed of primary importance. Forced indus­
trialization was a prominent example of this. Such a system inevitably 
led to expanding decay in increasing parts of the economic periphery. 
Collectivization totally undermined the agricultural base of society and 
saddled the country with a permanent food problem. The development 
of an enormous military-industrial complex devoured fantastic natural, 
human, financial, etc. resources and constantly depressed the living 
standards and the purchasing power of the population. A major nega­
tive role was played by the oil boom of the 1970s which made it possible 
to cover up the growing agricultural crisis by increasing imports. Behind 
a facade of artificial indicators, juggled statistics and polished images the 
country was sliding into decay and unruliness.
Perestrojka was perceived by many as an attempt to overcome this 
growing crisis of the whole production system, primarily through 
changes in the regulatory mechanism (at first relatively minor ones). A 
societal regulatory mechanism is the overall result of a constant inter­
action between economic, political, social, cultural, ideological, moral 
and ethical processes in society. Each of these areas constitutes an im­
portant part of the overall framework in which people live, take deci­




























































































motivations and restrictions on the activities of individuals and social 
groups. The complex interaction of these components creates a regula­
tory mechanism of societal development, in which this or that part 
(depending on concrete circumstances) can play a more or a less promi­
nent role. It goes without saying that acknowledging the existence of a 
regulatory mechanism in society is not the same as considering events 
to be under permanent conscious control.
In Western society each component of the regulatory mechanism is 
highly-developed, diversified, sophisticated, complex. Each one evolves 
according to its internal logic, but they constantly interact, influence and 
reinforce one another. And with few exceptions — when, for instance, 
there is a political, economic or other crisis — they move more or less 
in one general direction. This is an important prerequisite of relatively 
durable societies. Pluralism and a relatively high degree of freedom 
stimulate initiative and spontaneous development, thus creating a viable 
combination of stability and flexibility.
In the former Soviet Union all the above mentioned component parts 
were more simplistic, crude and unsophisticated. They constituted a very 
compact, closely-knit and constantly interacting mechanism subordinated 
to only one overall task — the preservation and stabilization of the 
existing command-administrative system, which was highly rigid and 
inflexible.
There have been many attempts to differentiate and classify the 
different types of regulatory models. Among the most fruitful, in my 
view, are those, proposed by K. Polnyi and by the proponents of 
market-hierarchy-network models of social life coordination. It seems we 
can justifiably speak of the existence of three types of regulatory 
mechanisms: 1) command-administrative rule, 2) self-regulation and 3) 
corrective regulation.
Hierarchical, command-administrative rule was historically the preva­
lent form of social regulation. It presupposed the subordination of so­
ciety to a narrowly defined overriding aim — be it the creation of an 
empire, the building of pyramids, the conquering of neighbours or the 
establishment of an ideal society. All the major activities in the dynamic 
part of society were oriented towards achieving this main objective. 
Such a society could exist only against a background of large-scale 
subsistence and semi-subsistence economies which helped society to sur­
vive if or when the pursuit of the major objective lead to serious pro­
blems. Command-administrative societies were relatively stable, some­
times prosperous for the ruling elite, but inflexible, incapable of inno­




























































































Self-regulating societal relations on a broad scale are historically a 
more recent phenomenon. To a large degree they are a product of a 
relatively highly developed division of labour in the economy and the 
polity and consequently of growing interdependencies in society. They 
presuppose the participation of much broader parts of the population 
in active social relations, a more responsible attitude of people to 
societal problems and needs. Markets, democracy, social mobility, en­
lightened debate and in the final analysis various freedoms and human 
rights become major elements in the regulatory mechanism of society. 
Most of these elements are considered to be self-regulatory and to lead, 
more or less automatically, to a better, more progressive society. 
Leaving aside the vagueness of the notion of progress, it became 
evident, as time went by, that each one of these elements functioned 
with substantial failures and could not automatically lead to any desired 
status of society (market failures, democratic weaknesses, etc.).
Even more recently the increasing recognition of failures in self- 
regulatory mechanisms is leading to numerous attempts to find alterna­
tive solutions or remedies. The construction of a purely socialist society 
based on central planning was in this respect one of the most ambitious 
and unsuccessful ones. At present most Western countries are trying to 
find possible solutions along the lines of corrective regulation, which 
presupposes the continued (and even sometimes expanded) functioning 
of previous self-regulatory mechanisms, but at the same time the crea­
tion of an elaborate system of monitoring, analysing and defining 
emerging problem areas, so as to take necessary corrective action. Such 
a society demands an elaborate infrastructure, information network, 
analytical apparatus and sophisticated implementation machinery. All of 
this would take a very long time to create in the prevailing conditions 
of Russia. Moreover Western societies themselves have not as yet found 
satisfactory solutions to the vitally important issue of safeguarding 
democracy and public decision-making in conditions which tend to fa­
vour technocratic approaches, the use of expertise and professional 
knowledge. In the beginning of the 1990s this type of analysis only 
added to the confusion in parts of the then Soviet society as to the 
directions that perestrojka and the transition of Soviet society could and 
should take.
Perestrojka was an attempt to change the whole regulatory complex 
of society, to move out of one regulatory system into another. The de­
sire to do away with command-administrative totalitarianism was evi­
dent. The final aim of the transition was much less clear, not only to the 
general public but also to the initiators of this great transformation. 




























































































they were in the 1980s. Their present and future writings are of no help 
— they inevitably reflect the authors thinking at the moment of writing, 
not at the moment described. Their statements at the time of action are 
also of little use — if the present outcome of perestrojka was even to 
a small degree premeditated, it would have been extremely dangerous 
for its initiators to even hint at such intentions (since they would have 
immediately been ousted by the broader establishment in power). 
Accordingly the idea of transition from the existing system was openly 
proclaimed only in very general terms, but the final aim of the transition 
was always defined in the most abstract and vague terms — civilized 
society, markets, democracy, etc. Only later were these objectives made 
more concrete in the course of sharp ideological debates and political 
battles.
Moreover, it is very hard to find out which events were really beyond 
the control of politicians and which were a result of their farsighted 
actions and manoeuvers. Towards the end of the 1980s, however, events 
increasingly overtook the reformers and they were forced not so much 
to initiate new changes, as to react to unintended and unforeseen situa­
tions. Grassroots pressure for more drastic transformations was mount­
ing. But so too was the old guard’s resistance to change. New initiatives 
by reformers were increasingly blocked by restraining activities in a 
polarizing situation. The major aim became a postponement of a conser­
vative backlash which was quite evidently building up.
Any attempt to define the real aims pursued by the major groups of 
politicians is made even more difficult by the fact that future develop­
ments now lend themselves to various interpretations. Some people 
today continue to think that the main aim of perestrojka was the 
building of a new, better, more modern, civilized society; accordingly 
they justify many controversial actions by the need for skilful manoeu- 
vering to keep up the momentum for change. Others consider that the 
transformations were aimed more narrowly at streamlining the old 
system, getting rid of incompetence etc. Others still consider that the 
driving force behind perestrojka was pressure from previously corrupted 
groups who accumulated large resources and needed legitimacy and 
more scope for new activities. Lately — allegations of treachery and 
treason, of a sell-out to foreign capital and interests are increasingly 
heard. Such allegations are inflaming various nationalistic feelings and 
movements. Leaving aside the practical impossibility of ascertaining the 
real motives of the initiators of perestrojka, I do not think that it would 
be fruitful to try to define the role of this or that motive in the 
elaboration of perestrojka. The worst that can happen at present is that 




























































































misdeeds and at the same time hopelessly lose any prospect for real 
development and betterment.
What is important is that profound changes were initiated in 
practically all spheres of social life — political, economical, cultural, 
moral, ethical. These changes are so well known that it is not necessary 
to enumerate them here, except to point out specifically those changes 
in the field of culture and ethics which have received least attention in 
the West.
In the economic field, market formation was viewed as the best 
possible alternative to the existing system. But there was far too little 
real understanding and knowledge about the working of the market, let 
alone the transition to a market economy. The advice that came from 
abroad concentrated on the need for speed (shock therapy), and on the 
automaticity of the market once it was given freedom to operate. All 
the negative — economic and non-economic — aspects of the market 
were hushed up; as was the elaborate system of state and social regu­
lation of the market which exists in the West. In the euphoria of 
dismantling central planning a discussion of these vital issues seemed 
inappropriate. The numerous pitfalls in the transition from a very 
unusual starting point were either not known or not thought about 
seriously. Added to that was the passive and often active sabotage of 
the old guard nomenclatura. Internal inexperience and incompetence 
blended with traditionalist advice from abroad are leading to a highly 
distorted process of market formation. A market capable of stimulating 
the expansion of production (or just of sustaining existing levels of 
production) is still far beyond the horizon. In the first quarter of 1992, 
investments into production fell by more than 40%, compared with the 
first quarter of 1991. The old system of economic governance is largely 
demolished and losing its hold, but no new system has taken over. And 
no one can say how long it will take for one to emerge and start 
functioning.
An added factor in the situation is the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union. Among various other reasons this was also stimulated by the 
prospect of market formation. On the one hand inefficient economic 
units (and they — if international standards are applied — are in an 
evident majority) are trying to protect themselves against market forces 
by any and all means — including cessation. On the other hand local 
powers are hoping through increased political power to acquire a bigger 
role in the inevitable privatization process, which will lead to the 
establishment of ownership rights over historically unprecedentedly large 




























































































that as it may disintegration of the USSR is further hampering and 
distorting the transition to the market.
In the lively discussions on the future of Russia primary attention is 
focused on the speed of transformation and market creation. But the 
really decisive, central issue — that of the type of markets that are 
going to emerge in the reforming countries — is rarely even mentioned. 
Most discussants try to evade or circumvent the issue. All the talk is 
about “markets” as such, generally speaking. If any definitions are used 
it is the word “free”, presumably in contrast to regulated or state 
influenced. At the same time everybody knows that there are numerous 
types of different markets, productive and speculative, efficient and less 
so, etc. Are these distinctions irrelevant for the reforming countries? Is 
it equally desirable if their efforts go predominantly into speculation or 
into production? What should be the balance and interaction between 
internal markets and external? All these are vital issues for any market 
formation process. Therefore let us for a moment look into the existing 
historical experience in this field to see what it can tell us.
* * *
Given the great variety of market formation processes in history, it is 
none the less possible to discern the major prerequisites of success. The 
first is the most widely cited — that of the establishment of private 
property rights; maybe it would be more correct to talk about a strict 
delineation of economic functions, ownership rights and responsibilities. 
The second is the establishment of an efficient system of governance in 
which not only law enforcement, but also a large degree of public legi­
timacy, trust and stability play a prominent role. Thirdly an accumu­
lation of purchasing power, capital, technology, management skills, 
innovative and research capacities, productive and social infrastructures 
is essential. Fourthly, everywhere in developed market economies the 
state plays an active role in economic management; hence economic 
competence and integrity become vital elements of success, as do 
various mechanisms of interaction between government and interest 
groups. Last but not least, a comparatively stable and viable interrela­
tionship with the world economy has to be established.
Not all of these prerequisites are equally emphasized and explained 
by Western social scientists. Many of the elements of market formation 
are so commonplace and evident to Western scientists and observers 
(and implicit in their thinking) that they are rarely spelled out. But for 
the latecomers and especially for the former centrally planned societies 




























































































indispensable factors. And most important of all, it is necessary to 
understand how these prerequisites emerged and took hold without seri­
ously disrupting the life support system of society.
Historically market formation (and its subsequent evolution) always 
meant a profound transformation of the life support system of society. 
Experience of most countries shows that this has also been a gradual 
process (taking several generations if not centuries) during which old 
institutions, structures, ideologies and value systems were slowly 
squeezed out and new ones gradually installed. Violent changes and 
upheavals sometimes took place; but they were very rarely conducive to 
market formation or to socio-economic development. Those upheavals 
that took place were (in a historic perspective) relatively limited in size 
and affected only a minor part of society. The main elements of the life 
support system as a rule remained intact.
In all non-centrally planned societies, market formation commenced 
when the major part of the population was still occupied in subsistence 
and semi-subsistence economies. For a long time markets enveloped 
only a very small sector of society. Market failures, conflicts and even 
catastrophes could easily be compensated by the continued functioning 
of the semi-subsistence sector. As market relations expand, they slowly 
take over bigger parts of the life support system of society. But even in 
the more advanced stages of transition to a market economy the semi­
subsistence sector continues to cushion market inadequacies and contra­
dictions and safeguards the life support system from most contingencies. 
As the semi-subsistence sector erodes, the safeguarding of the life 
support system against the possible consequences of market failures 
becomes a major function of the state.
One of the most difficult aspects of market formation has always been 
the transition from a predominantly speculative (trade and finance 
dominated) market to a predominantly productive one (in which most 
investments are directly or indirectly motivated and conditioned by the 
needs of production). For each given country, at a certain stage of its 
development this distinction is very important since it largely defines the 
prospects for the future. The distinction we are trying to draw is far 
from clear-cut. Many countries still continue to oscillate from one state 
to another. Hyperinflation usually leads to an evident preponderance of 
speculative activities over productive investments. Deregulation in the 
1980s has at times given speculative markets a visible edge over produc­
tive ones. But historically the most usual experience was that long 
periods of expanding speculative markets tended to create some of the 
prerequisites necessary for the transition to a productive market. After 




























































































necessary conditions for the transition. Often these were wars, which 
disrupted previous supply patterns and made investments into produc­
tion unexpectedly profitable — as in some countries in Asia and Latin 
America. In some cases the decisive factors were competent protection­
ist policies and well conceived forms of state intervention. More recently 
cases can be cited, when this transition has acquired more premeditated 
features. The prospect of integration into the EEC, for instance, has 
stimulated a multi-stage, internationally negotiated approach to transi­
tion in some of the southern countries of Europe.
Market formation in a given country can never be a purely internal 
process. It inevitably interacts in many ways with the international 
economy. In most cases market formation has to a larger or smaller 
degree been instigated from outside be it by colonialism and force, be 
it by peaceful economic expansion and demonstration effect. Moreover 
there is always the possibility of achieving some short-cuts in 
development by profiting from the experience of other countries, 
transferring structures and technologies, discovering new niches in the 
world economy.
But the impact of the world markets is not only a stimulating one; 
they also impose certain criteria of efficiency and competitiveness that 
often create severe problems for economically backward areas and cons­
titute a real danger for their life support system. A backward economy 
is by definition ineffective. But market structured development has a 
strong bias in favour of technical progress and rapid structural changes. 
This is a very capital intensive type of development. Efficiency and 
competitiveness are achieved mostly through large-scale externalization 
of costs. More modern productive systems demand more elaborate and 
diverse infrastructures. This (especially in economically backward areas) 
inevitably leads to a concentration of efficient activities in enclaves or 
poles of development. But this same process is simultaneously a process 
of marginalization of a large part of the population, since there is not 
enough capital, competence, skills and infrastructure to employ existing 
manpower in sufficiently competitive production. The highly competitive 
sector (on a market basis) cannot satisfy the needs of the marginalized 
population since the latter has lost its productive base and hence its 
main source of purchasing power. Growth in market efficiency most 
often goes hand in hand with a marginalization of increasing sectors of 
the population.
Market-structured development means that the gap between the para­
meters of what we call the world economy and the main parameters 
prevailing in a backward economy will constantly grow. This creates an 




























































































process of integration into the world economy. Since modernization and 
competition tend to destroy the “inefficient” life support system of the 
marginalized part of society, this latter can survive and conserve its basis 
of life only if it starts defending, protecting itself against the invasion of 
market forces. Such protectionist measures are primarily economic, but 
also social, cultural, religious, ethical, etc.
Historically protectionism at first took on very primitive and crude 
forms. During the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century 
the most usual method was that of direct restrictions on imports, of 
protectionist tariffs and other means of infant industry protection. As 
national and international economies became more complex the means 
of controlling the interaction between the national and the international 
economy also became more complex and sophisticated. Protection was 
achieved increasingly through various new forms of state intervention 
— subsidies, tax exemptions, industrial and structural policies, social 
policies, etc. Special strategies were elaborated to foster changes in 
economic structures and technological development as a way of 
modifying existing patterns of international division of labour and 
creating a more favourable international competitive positions for the 
given country. As more sophisticated methods were introduced most 
countries seemed to slide from traditional forms of protectionism to 
more indirect but maybe more efficient methods of state intervention 
and neo-protectionism. Various strategies were elaborated (import- 
substitution, export-promotion, etc.), which at first were thought of as 
incompatible alternatives but which with time were seen to interact in 
a more complex and even complementary manner. Moreover the exter­
nal aspects of development strategies were in an increasing number of 
cases seen to intermingle with broader issues of supply-side and/or 
demand-side economics.
In theory as well as in practice (especially if we take the Bretton 
Woods institutions) there is a trend to outlaw any and all protectionist 
activities on the ground that they conflict with economic efficiency. Such 
an approach tends to impose free trade and open market policies on all 
nations, irrespective of their concrete current situation and development 
needs and priorities. Today’s international economy is a very complex 
mechanism in which free trade and economic liberalism are just one 
trend; it has to coexist with various forms and methods of national pro­
tection (which pursue not only economic but also social, environmental 
and other needs). These latter constitute an integral part of internation­
al economic relations and attempts to liquidate them are often unreal­
istic and counterproductive. It is much more fruitful to discuss the 




























































































interaction, than to try and totally eliminate an aspect of the world 
economy, which is vitally necessary for the existence of many societies.
There is one more aspect of the functioning of the market, which is 
much less studied and more controversial, but which nonetheless 
deserves special mention. As with any social phenomenon the market 
has its positive and negative sides. It seems that the more homogeneous 
a society, the more the market has a chance to develop its positive 
aspects, the less apparent its disequilibrating features. (This does not 
exclude that the market has a tendency to foster inequalities even in the 
most homogeneous situations.) The more unequal, unbalanced the 
starting situation, the more the market tends to expose its negative, 
destructive sides (not only economically but also socially, ecologically, 
morally).
Numerous market failures have given rise in all Western countries to 
different forms of state intervention into the working of the market. 
This intervention takes on various forms and is not limited to purely 
economic measures of macro-economic regulation. Social policies 
transform many aspects of the market, and tend to increase purchasing 
power and thus to stimulate the wide-spread introduction of standard­
ized mass production. Recently, environmental regulation has become 
a prominent factor in reshaping the market and transforming its mode 
of functioning. At present the market in Western societies is very far 
from a free market; it is riddled with endless forms of state intervention, 
which substantially modify its functioning. The much talked about 
deregulation of the 1980s has not seriously changed the situation — one 
form of regulation more often than not was replaced by a new one. 
Todays’ mechanism of socio-economic regulation in the West constitutes 
a very complex interaction of stochastic market forces with various 
forms of state intervention and regulation.
Most of this was not understood in the USSR when perestrojka 
began. But it must have been so evident in the West that western 
advisers did not see the need to spell it out. Be that as it may, during 
the whole perestrojka process economic reform was the weakest link in 
the chain of transformations. All efforts were concentrated on the 
destruction of the old system of management and on the creation of 
some of the conditions indispensable for market formation and 
functioning. But most of the old barriers to free enterprise still 
remained. Dispersed elements of market conditions could not assure a 
normal functioning of the market; but all hopes were focused on 
automatic solutions once the market started functioning. As a result 
Russia now is faced with a snowballing economic crisis and a likely 




























































































In such circumstances the transition to a market economy becomes 
especially difficult. The country does not have any subsistence or semi­
subsistence sector to talk about; accordingly it cannot hope in this 
fashion to cushion the negative effects of market failures and transition 
difficulties on the life support system of society. On the other hand 
serious government intervention is hindered by ideological factors (an 
aversion to planning and any kind of state economic activities), and 
liberal policies imposed by foreign advisers and by conditions on which 
foreign aid is extended. Existing structures and institutions distort 
emerging markets and direct market forces into predominantly non­
productive channels, thus further weakening the life support system.
To a very large degree this is because the specific features of society 
in the former USSR have been persistently ignored. We may sum up by 
listing seven specific consequences of this oversight:
1) Decades of anti-market activity by the state have created uniquely 
unfavourable conditions for spontaneous market formation and 
constructive entrepreneurship in the country.
2) Many people are wary (if not openly antagonistic) to private property 
and market relations. This leads to a highly distorted market since 
potential entrepreneurs refrain from making long-term investments in 
major productive facilities and prefer more lucrative short-term specu­
lative and financial operations. This tends to foster highly distorted 
market structures.
3) The market in Russia is being introduced after the country has 
already become a major industrial power. Large-scale industrial 
structures with far-reaching interdependencies and protracted produc­
tion chains have been created, but all this has taken place on a non- 
market basis. The military-industrial complex plays an exceedingly large 
role and its conversion to civilian production poses very large and 
specific social and economic problems of their own. As a result the 
existing structures are in many cases incompatible with the functioning 
of the market, with market prices and market ratios. This adds a very 
burdensome new dimension to the market formation process. Moreover 
most of the productive apparatus is obsolete and in need of urgent 
reequipment and modernization.
4) The gap between the real economy and the financial sphere — which 
in the West is also beginning to pose difficult problems (“casino 




























































































Budgetary financing of state owned enterprises, laxness in regulating 
monetary emission, voluntaristic, monopolistic prices, large-scale failure 
to repay loans have given top urgency to the need for financial 
stabilization.
5) The transition to a market economy is being undertaken in the 
largest country in the world with very high differentials in productivity, 
economic potentials, technological capacities, human resources. The 
growth of nationalism (which is partially fuelled by unequal starting 
positions) in its turn tends to aggravate the issues, gives rise to 
separatist tendencies, threatens to tear the emerging market apart 
(before it has time really to establish itself).
6) In contrast to most countries, where market formation began when 
natural resources were perceived to be limitless, this process in Russia 
is commencing in an atmosphere of growing environmental concern. 
This has numerous implications for freedom of enterprise, pricing, state 
intervention and other aspects of market formation.
7) A market is being created in a country that is very superficially 
integrated into the world economy. This means that the transition to the 
market will necessitate not only internally-induced structural changes 
but also the need to find a suitable place in the world market, to 
achieve a satisfactory level of competitiveness by international stand­
ards, to find appropriate forms of specialization, to make full use of the 
“human factor”, etc.
All these features constantly interact and their cumulative effect is to 
substantially aggravate all the problems and conflicts of market for­
mation. Large differentials increase the wariness of the more backward 
areas and spheres towards the introduction of market relations. Wide­
spread distrust of the market (coupled with large-scale unbalances in 
the economy, complex interdependencies and a precarious state of the 
environment) predetermines a situation when financial stabilization will 
not automatically lead to economic growth. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult to define where structural change and technological moderniza­
tion should be a prerequisite, and where a result of the establishment 
of market relations.
This does not exclude the fact that Russia has several major advan­
tages conducive to economic development and market formation — rich 




























































































a formidable research potential. This will also introduce unusual fea­
tures into the market formation process.
Special mention should be made of the interaction between the 
economic and social dimensions of market formation. The historical 
heritage of an all-pervading social security system in Russia is very 
important. It predefines a low purchasing power of most of the popu­
lation and numerous market distortions. As market relations grow the 
danger of marginalization quickly becomes not only a socio-economic 
but also a political issue (fundamentalism, backlash tendencies, etc.). 
Ingrained perceptions of social justice and memories of recent levels of 
living, increase the potential for social stress and undermine any 
legitimacy the market might have acquired.
* * *
Let us now return to present events in Russia where perestrojka has 
lead to numerous changes in all walks of life, both internally (in the 
former Soviet Union) and internationally in the world arena. Positive 
achievements (as always) are intermingled with negative ones, with the 
emergence of new problems. I would like to focus attention on three 
major results of perestrojka, since they are very important for the West 
and for future developments.
First of all — a fundamental change has happened in the world 
arena, a lessening of international tension, an end to the arms race; a 
totally new atmosphere now governs relations between countries. This 
is a major achievement, the beneficial consequences of which — 
economic, political, social, cultural — are very widely spread. This 
creates new prerequisites for the solution of numerous developmental 
and environmental problems, and opens up numerous new horizons and 
possibilities. The major costs of these changes have, however, to be 
carried by the former Soviet Union, where most of the difficult 
transformations took and are taking place. In this context a more 
understanding attitude by the world community and a greater involve­
ment in the search for ways to overcome the difficulties and upheavals 
of transition would be helpful.
Secondly, the old system of governance has been drastically under­
mined. This is most obviously reflected in the disintegration of the 
USSR. The Soviet Union as a unitary political, military, economic entity 
has ceased to exist. This was the result of skilful manoeuvering in the 
autumn of 1991, which smashed Gorbachov’s attempts to reform rela­
tions inside the federation without dissolving it. The methods by which 




























































































precedent that could easily be reproduced at the level of the Russian 
Federation. Hence it is too early to say that the disintegration process 
has spent itself.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union means that the old system of 
centralized command-administrative governance (at the previous federal 
level) has practically been demolished. The central ministries have lost 
their power (which was partially transferred to the state apparatus of 
Russia and to a lesser extent of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other CIS 
countries). The activities of the Communist party were practically 
suspended; numerous other parties and political organizations tried to 
step in and acquire part of the CPSU role. The armed forces have 
become a serious bone of contention between the newly emerging mem­
ber states of the CIS; in the existing balance of power the army might 
become a political force on its own. The KGB has been broken up and 
reorganized; large remaining parts of it have been integrated into the 
government apparatus of Russia and other CIS countries. This is 
creating a very contradictory new situation. The break-up of the old 
system of governance was not accompanied by a parallel creation of a 
new system of governance. In some respects a loss of governance is 
perceivable; in many cases there exists a strange mixture of different 
conflicting elements.
Remnants of the old system are not hard to find. The old guard no- 
menclatura retains considerable power and influence — through pre­
vious networks, inertia in public attitudes and thinking, contentions that 
previous times were better, etc. The nomenclatura has lost only a small 
part of its power at the regional and local level. The old psychology also 
remains in large part intact. There still exists in many circles a feeling 
that the main issue is one of taking the appropriate decision (at a suffi­
ciently high level) and then implementation would be more or less auto­
matic. On the other hand the vast majority of the population continues 
to expect that all vital decisions will be taken by the “relevant”, 
“competent” authorities and does not consider itself responsible for 
what is happening. Moreover the feeling of not being able to influence 
the course of events is rampant. A substantial part of the population 
has not yet overcome its intimidated thinking, unquestioning attitudes 
to orders, conformity, conservatism and other features instilled during 
the stalinist and post-stalinist epochs. In this sense society is still 
saturated with various elements of command-administrative structures 
and mentalities, which under various conditions could be easily trans­
formed into different undesirable monopolistic constellations, including 




























































































On the other hand new social forces and personalities are emerging, 
new parties and associations are putting forth programmes and propo­
sals, creating a semblance of democratic governance. New thinking is 
increasingly pervading all areas. Innovation and activity are replacing 
conformism and apathy. Powershifts between the legislature and the 
executive are constantly changing the situation and making stable devel­
opment ever more difficult. Local power groups are exploiting the situa­
tion in attempts to broaden their power basis.
This leads us to a discussion of the third major result of perestrojka 
— the practical introduction of pluralism into many aspects of social 
life. In a very short historic time a large society has moved from mo­
nolithic, monopolistic structures and institutions into a pluralistic 
framework. A one-party system has given way to a political system with 
numerous parties and non-governmental organizations. A political 
system based on a division of power between the legislature, executive 
and judiciary has been conceived and has started functioning. Tripartite 
arrangements between state, entrepreneurs and workers are being dis­
cussed but have not been seriously implemented. New social groups with 
specific interests and demands have emerged; foremost among them — 
a class of entrepreneurs and nouveaux riches, whose activities are con­
centrated more in speculative, than in productive fields.
But the emergence of pluralism is not accompanied by the creation 
of a corresponding institutional framework capable of moderating or 
reconciling divergent interests and regulating conflicts. There is no 
adequate delineation of functions, rights and responsibilities; as a result 
new institutions are constantly fighting over areas of competence, sover­
eign rights etc. The “war of laws” is a telling example, when organiza­
tions at different levels refused to abide by decisions taken at higher 
levels, saying that the latter did not have either legitimacy or compe­
tence to adopt the disputed decisions. Such a situation is a serious 
impediment to governance and stability in society and to a normal func­
tioning of any political, economic and/or social system. Battles between 
newly formed institutions for more political power are aggravated by the 
prospect of privatization, in the course of which political positions will 
play a major role in the distribution of enormous wealth.
Another aspect of pluralism, that is now surfacing is the rapidly 
growing economic differentiation of society, which in a few years has 
opened up a very real prospect of a recently egalitarian society being 
transformed into a dualistic society with small enclaves of westernized 
elites and a vast majority of the population sinking below the poverty 
line. The hope is that the market will stimulate an expansion of 




























































































able prerequisites for a transition from a speculative to a productive 
market are non-existent. In these circumstances rapidly growing dualism 
creates a very dangerous basis for social upheavals, ideological 
backlashes and political adventurism.
The second half of 1991 was in many ways a turning point in the evo­
lution of events and policies, initiated by perestrojka. Many transforma­
tions that were slowly gathering pace suddenly came to a head and 
brought about serious changes. Most obvious among them is the rapidly 
deteriorating economic and political crisis, which is grinding develop­
ment to a painful halt. Numerous laws and decisions, which could have 
helped in the installation of market relations were increasingly sabo­
taged and could not function. A tangible powershift also become evi­
dent in society. The new emerging entrepreneurial groups acquired in­
creasing influence, especially after the events of August 1991. The 
interaction of these groups with the old guard nomenclatura reflects a 
new balance of forces. And most important of all (as we have already 
seen) — the break-up of the Soviet Union, which created a totally new 
framework for future development.
Behind all these transformations — less discussed but increasingly 
influential — is the continuing break-up of the life support system in 
Russia. This process was tangibly accelerated by numerous mistakes and 
miscalculations since the beginning of perestrojka. The latter (as already 
mentioned) was in no small degree conceived as an attempt to counter 
such a break-up. And, undoubtedly, wise and farsighted policies could 
have gone a long way to remedy the situation. But unfortunately the 
policies pursued were far from optimal.
Under the guise of introducing market relations many of the old 
restrictions limiting various economic malpractices and the abuse of 
political power were in small doses during perestrojka either abolished 
or toned down. Policy measures and strategies, ostensibly aimed at 
giving freedom to market forces in practice had some very negative 
consequences. Thus the first law of 1987, granting certain economic 
freedoms to enterprises and opening up some possibilities of creating 
independent enterprises led to a disintegration of many established 
production chains. In practice, individual enterprises and or workers’ 
collectives when they opted for independent status effectively disrupted 
existing production ties and often (in highly monopolized and interde­
pendent structures) in various ways created difficulties for the produc­
tion of the final products. At the same time many ministries utilized this 
law to establish quasi-independent enterprises through which they got 
a splendid chance to by-pass existing price regulations pertaining to 




























































































Another major step allegedly aimed at introducing the market was the 
slackening of existing restrictions on the transfer of resources from cash 
to non-cash accounts and the permission to pay cash for certain types 
of sub-contracted works. This led to a tremendous flow of previously 
blocked funds into various kinds of semi-legal transactions, which in one 
way or another tended to increase real payrolls. In the final analysis this 
became a serious factor stimulating increases in monetary emissions, 
which very soon escalated to totally irresponsible dimensions.
A major stumbling block to market formation was (and still is) the 
fantastically distorted system of price ratios, which precluded any 
rational market-oriented policies. These distortions had historically 
accumulated (because of social policies, attempts to stimulate industrial­
ization through low energy and raw material prices, etc.) and were 
sustained at the cost of tremendous state expenditures. The size of 
these distortions was such that it was inconceivable that they could be 
overcome by the working of the market mechanism on its own. One 
example. If we take an average ride in public transport anywhere in the 
Western world it will cost about one dollar. An average personal 
computer costs about one thousand five hundred dollars. The ratio is 
1:1,500. In the former Soviet Union a similar ratio equals 1:300,000, or 
1:500,000. Similar disparities prevail in relation to the vast majority of 
products.In many cases the deviation of price ratios existing in the 
USSR from average world levels has to be measured in hundreds of 
times. (In Eastern European countries similar deviations could usually 
be measured in tens of times.) Disproportions of such magnitudes 
cannot be overcome by market forces alone, serious preliminary state 
intervention to narrow down the gaps by changing existing production 
structures, productivity levels, consumption patterns is needed. When oil 
prices in the West were distorted threefold in the 1970s it took the 
market more than a decade to overcome the consequences — with very 
tangible state participation.
During the perestrojka years numerous attempts were made to 
change existing price ratios. The one time prime minister N. Ryskow 
proposed an interesting solution — prices on subsidized consumer goods 
were to be raised, subsidies cut and the corresponding economies were 
to be paid out to the population as compensation for price rises. From 
the point of view of market formation such an approach had a big 
advantage in that it would have led to an increase in internal purchasing 
power and invigorated a market mechanism reflecting internal economic 
needs. The proposal was however opposed by many statesmen who 
wanted price rises to give additional budgetary income. The population 




























































































pay out full compensation. (As a footnote it might be pointed out that 
two years later the country had to accept a much greater price rise with 
much smaller compensation — since prices were liberalized without 
having preliminarily demonopolized existing structures.)
As a stimulus to foreign trade, export restrictions and exchange 
controls were partially lifted. In a situation when the internal market 
was contracting this lead to an unexpectedly large expansion of exports 
and simultaneously a tremendous fall in the value of the rouble.
The economic policies pursued by consecutive governments in the 
former USSR and later in the CIS lack coherence and do not conform 
to any strategy of transition to a market economy. They suffer from 
overliberalization in some areas and rigid adherence to old regulatory 
systems in other fields. Economic incompetence, a total lack of under­
standing of market specifics and, evidently, sabotage by old guard 
nomenclatura at central and local levels only tend to aggravate the 
situation.
Since the end of 1991 the new Russian government has been con­
centrating its efforts on attempts to stabilize the financial situation 
through price increases, tax levies and other instruments which in some 
countries have at times given positive results (primarily in cases when 
the gap between financial and real economy indicators was many times 
smaller than it is in Russia at present). But these measures were imple­
mented in the worst possible manner and without sufficient thought 
being given to the sequence of change. Moreover some indispensable 
measures — first of all a drastic curbing of monetary emission and 
speculative credit — have not been realized. Such policies have placed 
Russia on the brink of hyperinflation; they are leading to a three to 
five-fold drop in living standards, to a contraction of internal purchasing 
power and internal consumer markets. Since a rapidly growing share of 
monetary incomes is devoted to food, the market for clothing, furniture 
and other consumer goods is shrinking; this is placing many otherwise 
efficient enterprises in the relevant industries on the brink of bankrupt­
cy. As a result, production is falling, vitally needed demand is not 
satisfied, requests for external humanitarian aid are growing. The 
prospect of hyperinflation is diverting existing accumulations from pro­
ductive investments into speculation. These distortions are in no way 
conducive to market formation for economic development. They are a 
result of a narrow preoccupation with financial solutions to problems, 
which in essence are economic and social and which are susceptible only 
to broader economic and social solutions. But they are tremendously 




























































































At present the Soviet Union is going through a serious economic and 
political crisis out of which it will most likely surface with a very specific 
type of mixed economy. A prominent role will be played by a modified 
state sector (largely fragmented between regions) which will include 
numerous quasi-state corporations, associations, etc. At the same time 
a very heterogeneous, distorted private sector, cumbersomely and 
incompetently regulated by the state is emerging. Of paramount impor­
tance for the country’s future will be the concrete type of regulatory 
mechanism that will pull together all these economic factors. Its general 
outlines are now taking shape. But important details (which will specify 
its functioning) are still to be defined. To a large degree they will 
depend on the perception of the problems and the sequence of possible 
solutions that will prevail. Of special significance are the non-economic 
aspects of development. It goes without saying that this process of 
creating a new regulatory mechanism will take a long time and we are 
seeing just its early stages.
Russia has a tremendous economic potential — human and natural 
resources, productive and research capacities. But they are concentrated 
outside the life support system, and/or they are not integrated into the 
civilian production process. The problem facing the country is primarily 
one of transferring the existing potential from where it is to where it is 
most needed to sustain society. If the market is to play any role in this 
process its main instrument — the purchasing power of the population 
must be fully brought into play. The policies pursued at present are 
doing exactly the opposite. Moreover, distorted structures and institu­
tions are creating an environment in which the market can only get the 
wrong signals and accordingly elicit the wrong responses. A relatively 
long transition period is inevitable in which a comprehensive state 
programme is essential to narrow down imbalances, bring productivity, 
price ratios, production structures closer to those prevailing in the world 
at large. Delegating problems of such dimensions and complexity purely 
to the market forces can only invite disaster.
The paramount task is to cut down the existing gaps, imbalances and 
disproportions both at the macro and the micro levels and narrow the 
existing discrepancies between financial and commodity flows. As the 
experience of recent years seems to convincingly show, price liberaliza­
tion at this stage is not an adequate solution. Given persisting monopoly 
structures and an increasingly skewed income distribution, prices tend 
to stabilize at a socially totally unacceptable and unsustainable level. 
And even this precarious stabilization is conditioned on rigid control of 
wages, which makes a mockery of the whole liberalization concept and 




























































































This pegging of wages in Russia at present is going hand in hand with 
a swiftly increasing pull on some prices of the external, export sector, 
exacerbated by a severely undervalued rouble. Prices on most commodi­
ties and services that can be exported, smuggled or in any other way 
exchanged for hard currencies are rapidly rising to something like a 
parity (at existing exchange rates) with world price levels. As a result, 
price liberalization is leading not to a narrowing down of the distortions 
between internal and world price ratios, but to their further growth.
As to structural transformation (including the enormous task of con­
verting the industrial-military complex to civilian production), industrial 
modernization, technological renovation — all these processes (as the 
experience of Western countries amply shows) always demand a certain, 
rather serious government participation and involvement. The main pro­
blem is to direct this involvement into channels that will be conducive 
to future market development and not become a stepping stone to a 
retreat into old state planning and command-administrative practices. 
Given the existing social structures and political alignments in the 
country this is not a simple task. And it is here that foreign experience 
and intellectual assistance is sorely needed.
Another major issue which with present structures and conditions 
cannot safely be left to the market is the question of the optimal 
relationship between inward and outward oriented development. Theo­
retically, the problem seems to be rather clear. External economic 
relations are expected to supplement and stimulate the internal 
development effort. In practice the situation is much more complex. To 
the extent that market forces are given any freedom, existing policies 
tend to foster outward oriented economic activities, due to depressed 
internal purchasing power, dwindling accumulations, lax exchange con­
trols, undervalued rouble, etc. This in turn aggravates most internal 
problems of market structures, income distribution, capital investment, 
resource allocation, management, training, etc. But I shall return to this 
question a little later.
It is impossible in one lecture to even enumerate all the economic 
issues, which disrupt the life support system of the former Soviet Union 
and which do not lend themselves to spontaneous solution by free mar­
ket forces. But it is important to point out that the introduction of the 
market, especially in the first stage, tends to aggravate rather than solve 





























































































The centrally planned command-administrative system tended in many 
respects to blur individual and institutional rights and responsibilities; 
this fostered a certain lawlessness and dependency relationships which 
gave the higher echelons of power additional leverage. The market on 
the contrary demands a strict delineation of functions, rights and 
responsibilities. The stumbling introduction of such a delineation in the 
last years is an extremely conflictual and painful process, acquiring very 
distorted forms and giving rise to lop-sided institutions and structures. 
I have already mentioned, that the lack of a clear delineation of func­
tions between political institutions is constantly destabilizing the political 
situation, leading to conflict of laws, etc. An analogous process is 
happening in the economic field.
Unfortunately, in Russia at present this problem is not finding any 
comprehensive solution. Most often it is being reduced to its more 
narrow and simple form — property ownership rights. In a country with 
nearly total state ownership of economic resources this means — priva­
tization. But as luck would have it, this is also a most controversial 
social and ideological issue. Several generations of people have — with 
little reward — put all their lives’ effort into the accumulation of the 
now existing productive apparatus, which was viewed as common pro­
perty. And they consider that this input should be adequately taken into 
account in any redistribution of existing wealth and property.
Given that the country has not known market relations and private 
property for many decades and that most of the means of production 
are in state ownership, privatization was from the very start quite 
evidently going to be a very vast and difficult process. But only in the 
last year and months is the population comprehending its real signifi­
cance, scope, magnitude and difficulty. The land, natural resources and 
industrial capacities (albeit very obsolete) of one sixth of the world, 
might in a relatively short time be transferred into private ownership. 
More than a quarter of a billion people are (somewhat belatedly) 
waking up to the fact that their individual economic and social status 
(and that of the future family generations) will very soon become 
predominantly dependent on the forms and methods by which this 
privatization process will be carried out.A tremendous powershift is 
taking place. Not only the distribution of current incomes is changing. 
Privatization means a fundamental transformation in the basis of power, 
in the future status and prospects of individuals and social groupings. 
The realization of this fact is having an increasing impact on the 
activities and mentality of a growing section of society. The lack of any 
socially accepted or even legally elaborated basis of this major process 




























































































illegitimacy for future market institutions. A tremendous spurt of 
irreconcilable ideological, political, legislative conflicts hinders the 
solution of current problems and makes progress towards market 
relations and any economic development even more difficult. The 
commencing powershift is giving a strong additional impetus to 
separatist movements, proclamations of sovereignty, conflicting 
legislation to say nothing of crime, corruption, erosion of moral and 
ethical values, etc. A new everyday word has appeared in the Russian 
language — “bespredel”, which should be translated as a crumbling of 
moral and legal restrictions.
In essence there exist at present many different concepts of privatiza­
tion in the former USSR. Various interest and social groups have their 
own vision of the forms, methods, legal framework, political setting, 
economic and managerial conditions in which this process should take 
place. The central and local governments, faced with acute budget and 
foreign payment deficits would prefer the outright sale of existing 
resources to the highest bidder. Such an approach is actively upheld by 
the nouveaux riches. The old nomenclatura managers would prefer a 
more conservative approach which would hand the existing enterprise 
over to them. Workers’ collectives have their own concept of these 
processes which would give them a bigger share in the ownership and 
management of their enterprises. A large part of the population is 
against any programme of privatization which would pass ownership into 
the hands of people whose fortunes were made in what they thought 
were unscrupulous or shady ways. Ideas of equitably sharing out existing 
assets between all groups of society are widely supported but it is not 
clear how it could be done, nor how various bureaucratic activities — 
unauthorized sale of assets, passing of property right to management 
groups, etc. could be stopped. In short, the need for privatization is 
more or less widely accepted. And entrepreneurship in the former So­
viet Union is quite evidently expanding. But if present practices (or to 
be more precise — malpractices) continue, growing parts of the popu­
lation could easily turn against privatization and market concepts as the 
only way to hinder unacceptable forms and methods of change. The 
present barbarous approaches to market formation may easily become 
counterproductive and jeopardize the prospects of market relations, 
their legitimacy and acceptability by society for a long time to come.
* * *
In these circumstances the West should ask itself several hard but very 




























































































continue to view the former USSR as a potential enemy (that has to be 
further weakened) or as a dangerous powder keg which has to be 
defused as quickly as possible? If we are to judge by practical actions 
and not by policy declarations, there still seems to be enough inertia in 
some quarters in the West to justify the posing of such a question. 
Much of the advice extended by the West (and much of the conditional­
ity on which foreign assistance is granted) does not take into account 
the specific problems of the CIS countries and first of all the precarious 
state of their life support system. Society in these countries depends on 
a highly industrialized and interdependent productive apparatus which 
can operate satisfactorily only if it is managed by a constantly function­
ing regulatory mechanism. The old mechanism — command-administra­
tive planning — is fundamentally undermined and is rapidly losing all 
capacities of control. The market mechanism will inevitably take a very 
long time before it can boast of sufficient legitimacy, trust, social 
infrastructure, accumulated legal and other institutions, management 
skills, entrepreneurial initiative, etc. to be able to take over the 
regulation of the existing complex life support structures in the former 
USSR. In these conditions narrowly conceived advice to focus all efforts 
on market formation could easily lead to catastrophe — and in the not 
so distant future.
A decision to continue regarding the former Soviet Union as an 
enemy that must be further weakened is a political decision that people 
in the West are perfectly free to take (or not to revise). Slowness in 
shifting to new appraisals is also not so surprising, given existing inertia 
in social and international fields. But their consequences are worth 
further elaboration. It is not realistic to suppose that more than a 
quarter of a billion people will quietly acquiesce in a rapid fall in their 
living standards below the poverty line without actively attempting to 
change existing trends.
This has, up to now, not been the case — on any large scale. Partially 
this is explained by mass hoarding of stocks in the previous period and 
by a subservient faith that the experts at the top know what they are 
doing and what is best. Both these factors are wearing out, especially in 
the light of the very controversial results in market formation: new 
incentives for investments in production have not emerged and produc­
tion itself is constantly falling. But there is another, more deep-rooted 
factor which explains the present passive popular attitudes towards 
unpopular measures by the government. And this is a feeling of frus­
tration, hopelessness and alienation, a dumb sense of impossibility to 
influence events and a fear of something even worse to come. This to 




























































































GULAG system which even today continues to play an important 
psychological role in society. To what extent perestrojka has changed 
this situation, and in what direction, is at present very hard to tell. Of 
late the unpredictability of possible reactions has been increased by the 
current economic and political crisis. But the present state of mind in 
Russia deserves special attention, given the Russian heritage of extrem­
ism, terrorism, anarchism, revolutions, etc. The existing socio-political 
situation in the former Soviet Union is very unstable. Internal policy 
mistakes compounded by inappropriate foreign advice and pressure are 
leading to a further aggravation of the economic situation; this is 
increasingly translated into social tension with a high potential of social 
unrest. The prospect of further destabilization and loss of governance 
is quite real. And nobody can say for sure whether a social upheaval 
will take place before or after the disarmament process has been 
successfully terminated. But several scenarios of possible developments 
could easily be proposed.
The first one would focus on the difficulties with which the conver­
sion process in the military-industrial complex has to cope. People with 
high industrial skills and research capacities are told to reorient their 
production not just to civilian needs but simultaneously to comply with 
the demands of the market. This is a very difficult transition made even 
harder by the rapid shrinking of the internal market. Export possibilities 
are restricted by saturated markets in the West and political and other 
limitations on exports of arms to some developing countries. Govern­
ment contracts have decreased drastically. The possibilities of survival 
as functioning economic entities, of paying salaries to the staff, of 
solving social and other problems are becoming dimmer and dimmer. In 
these circumstances it is not unthinkable that some of the influential 
people in this military-industrial complex will opt for a return to old 
policies and attitudes, to previous conditions, when they were in a 
privileged position and in control of a large part of the economy, if not 
of society.
Another scenario could focus on the very real danger of nationalistic 
and separatist movements and the threat of civil disturbances and wars 
in various regions. Practically speaking this is not an abstract scenario 
of a doubtful future but something that is already a reality of everyday 
life in several regions of the former Soviet Union. With a worsening of 
the economic situation and the growth of social tensions such events 
might easily become commonplace, further disrupting economic and so­
cial ties, creating new causes for social instability. With the existing level 
of nationalistic fervor it is hard to conceive that arms are not being 




























































































the fact that this is happening in a country strewn with atomic and other 
weapons of mass destruction. With the existing feeling of social injustice 
and national humiliation, it is very hard to predict the practical forms 
that possible fanatical and/or national grievances could take.
Growing dissatisfaction among the population could also lead to 
another scenario in which social stress will be translated primarily into 
acute political and ideological conflicts. Many of the new political 
parties are trying to cash in on the growing discontent of the people 
with rising prices, economic hardships,prospects of growing unemploy­
ment, etc. Demagogically these parties promise easy and quick solutions 
to difficult problems, appeal to old notions and nostalgic feelings of 
bygone times. They hope in such a way to create a political backing and 
to attempt in the future to come to power through elections or by other 
means. Increased political instability might lead the powers that be to 
resort to more dictatorial methods of rule.
Another possible scenario would concentrate on the growing decen­
tralization of economic and political power. The powershift towards 
regional and local authorities is very marked at present in Russia, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and some other CIS countries. This is tangibly 
undermining central authorities, eroding their economic and financial 
base and often creating potentially unstable relationship between 
legislative and between executive powers. Endless conflicts over the 
legitimate division of authority are seriously weakening the existing 
system of governance.
Newly emerging entrepreneurial social groups are imposing their 
ideology and culture on a recalcitrant population; this gives rise to 
various fundamentalist and traditionalist movements, which serve as an 
explosive background for nationalist and separatist tendencies.
As unemployment and other negative aspects of neo-liberal policies 
and the so called shock therapy begin to emerge an increasing number 
of highly skilled and qualified specialists will be thrown into the 
embraces of shady institutions and mafia-type organizations. This could 
easily lead to a qualitatively more dangerous situation not only internal­
ly (in the former USSR), but also internationally.
All these scenarios reflect existing trends in the former USSR society. 
Viewed together they seem to imply, that the CIS countries no longer 
constitute a threatening source of conventional warfare. But they are 
quickly becoming a dangerous source of civil strife, social disorder and 
economic disruption. Accordingly, the perspective under which events 
in these countries are viewed should be updated and reconsidered.
The present crisis in the former Soviet Union is not an ordinary 




























































































disintegration of the mechanism regulating an already complex, inter­
dependent life support system of a very large territory and population. 
The main danger stems from the difficulty (hopefully not the impossibi­
lity) of rapidly installing another viable regulatory mechanism. Up to the 
present moment only mosaic patches of legislation, needed for the intro­
duction of market relations in the former USSR have been adopted. 
But even their implementation is meeting strong resistance and many 
well intended initiatives have led (as we have seen) to totally unin­
tended and unexpected results. But the major problem stems from the 
fact that market relations, when they are based on a patchy, inconsistent 
legal and institutional framework (to say nothing of lopsided economic 
structures) inevitably become distorted and produce an average negative 
economic result — predominant investments into speculative trading 
and not into production, monopolistic practices, political-economic 
collusion, etc. In a context of depressed internal purchasing power, 
increased inequalities in income distribution, distorted productive 
structures, inconsistent legislative and institutional framework the 
market cannot function as a constructive guide neither to investments, 
nor to other economic activities.
The most urgent problem facing Russia now is to find a transitional 
regulatory mechanism capable of achieving a satisfactory balance 
between several conflicting tasks. These are:
— how to take over as quickly as possible the regulation of the already 
functioning productive apparatus and put a stop to the disintegration of 
the life support system;
— how to cut down the inefficiency in the economy, including the 
closure of inefficient plants and a more rational redistribution of 
resources;
— how to minimize old styled command-administrative state interven­
tion into the economy;
— how to create conditions conducive to a transition towards a 
civilized, western-style regulated market, capable of stimulating rational 
production structures, economic expansion and put an end to the 
continuing deterioration of living standards;
— how to achieve both market legitimacy and political stability.
Such a mechanism will have to function for a rather long time, since
it is not realistic to think that the prerequisites for a production 
oriented market (market and private property legitimacy, trust, legal 
framework, etc.) can be created in a short time span. At the same time 
(as any transitional mechanism) it cannot be rigid and must constantly 
evolve with time and changing circumstances. One of the most difficult 




























































































be used in defining which inefficient enterprises should receive some 
kind of temporary state support (since they are essential for the 
preservation of the life support system) and which should be allowed to 
go bankrupt (because they are overtaxing the economy). Existing im­
balances must be overcome. Price ratios must be brought into line with 
those existing in the world economy. A workable balance between spe­
culative and productive markets, conducive to economic development, 
must be established.
Even this short enumeration of the features which a regulatory 
mechanism in present day Russia and some of the other CIS countries 
must have (and the problems it must solve) in the near future highlights 
the many difficulties of its emergence. At the same time it is quite clear 
that we are not talking about a simple free market mechanism, which 
is totally inadequate to deal with most of the above-mentioned issues. 
A major intellectual effort is needed to define the best ways of fostering 
such a mechanism, of finding the optimal balance between the right 
types of state intervention and the working of the market. This is an 
area for fruitful research and of much needed assistance.
*  *  *
The second question that the West has to ask itself: is it interested in 
a maximum or a minimum outward orientation of the development pat­
tern of the former Soviet Union.
The processes evolving in the ex-USSR, and first of all the transition 
to market relations and the disintegration of the country, are stimulating 
a strong outward bias in development patterns and having an ever in­
creasing impact on the world economy. Both these processes constantly 
interact and reinforce one another. The first stages of market formation 
in the USSR gave a strong additional impetus to nationalistic and sepa­
ratist movements in many parts of the country, fostering hopes of inde­
pendent integration into the international economic community and lo­
cal control over privatization. On the other hand, the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union is to a very large extent fashioning the type of markets 
and the development strategies that are emerging in the member states 
of the CIS. Whatever form and magnitude these two processes acquire, 
they are in the final analysis going to have a very serious impact on the 
world economy — disrupting some sectors, reshaping others.
This stems from the very size of the ex-USSR economy. The former 
Soviet Union was comparable in territory, natural endowment and 
population with a whole continent, like Latin America or Africa. From 




























































































have to think in terms of say hyperinflation or privatization not in just 
Bolivia or even Argentina, but in the whole of South America.
In contrast to most developing countries the former Soviet Union was 
a highly industrialized state, with intricate interdependencies, long 
production chains and a high level of division of labour. The main 
problem facing the country previously, and its constituent parts now is 
not industrialization per se, not structural adjustment, but a profound 
structural transformation. And this in a situation when the life-support 
system of society already depends predominantly on an economy, whose 
distorted structures were defined irrespective of market forces and 
which today has moreover become technologically obsolescent. Previous 
decades of centrally planned economic growth have lead to a highly 
autarchic, inward-concentrated type of development, with a high degree 
of interdependence between constituent parts.
Market formation, whatever course it will take, inevitable will give an 
additional impetus to an outward-orientation of the development 
process. This follows from the need for foreign capital, technology, 
know-how, international standards and all the other attributes of 
competitiveness,which are so lacking in the Russian economy. This also 
stems from the negative aspects of market formation — lack of capital 
accumulation, growing unemployment (which fosters emigration), limited 
internal purchasing power, etc., which usually have a tendency of spilling 
over into new demands on the world economy.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union will substantially accelerate 
these tendencies. Previously each component part of the USSR was 
closely interwoven with other economic units in the country. Foreign 
economic ties were limited to a minimum. Now with the falling apart of 
the ex-USSR an accelerating process of outward orientation of the 
newly-emerging states has begun. Numerous economic ties, production 
chains and interdependencies, established during decades of forced 
industrialization in the USSR are being mutilated or torn to pieces. The 
distorted specialization of previous years is being brutally transformed 
by economic policies, which give priority to local needs and attempt (in 
a situation of increasing shortages) to satisfy these local needs by 
annulling previous commitments to other areas and/or by directing 
available resources into channels of direct barter trade. This trend is 
reinforced by a exceedingly high premium on hard currency, which 
makes most economic units ( to the extent that they are becoming 
increasingly independent) extremely interested in exporting abroad 
instead of selling for roubles.
Some idea of the size of the possible disruptions this can create can 




























































































exportable surplus of oil and gas production in Russia, about half was 
shipped to other republics of the Soviet Union and only the other half 
was exported outside of the USSR. With the independence of the 
Ukraine and Kazahkstan, Russia has been cut off from two vital sources 
of its grain consumption (in a situation when Russia was already a large 
importer from world markets). The disruptive spillover into the world 
economy from such processes could be enormous. Already now Russia 
and some of the other members of the CIS are selling large quantities 
of gold, platinum, uranium, aluminium and other primary commodities 
with depressing consequences for prices on the respective world 
markets. The grain imports and the needs for humanitarian aid of both 
Russia and the other CIS states are too well known to warrant special 
elaboration.
The convergence of market formation and the disintegration of the 
USSR is going to tremendously increase the impact of events in the 
former Soviet Union on international economic relations. Previously the 
Soviet Union had a small but more or less stable share in world trade 
and financial operations. Now this share is going to increase irrespective 
of the concrete forms that market formation and/or disintegration 
processes take. This will have both positive and negative effects for the 
Western economies. The capital-investment demands of the CIS coun­
tries are mostly going to aggravate an already difficult problem. The 
market formation process (if it takes rational, productive forms) could 
create new outlets for many branches of Western industry, that are 
today battling with saturated markets. The prospects of increased raw 
material and energy exports from CIS countries could — depending on 
their magnitude and conditions — be either conducive or dangerous for 
the Western economies.
The impact that the increasingly outward orientation of the former 
Soviet Union will have on developments in the West (its scope and 
character) will to a very large extent depend on two — predominantly 
political — factors: firstly, the concrete strategies and policies adopted 
in the former Soviet Union, the form and scale of economic reform in 
the constituent parts of the CIS and, secondly, on the degree to which 
their integration into the world economy will be left to spontaneous 
market forces or will be regulated by a preconceived, negotiated strat­
egy of changing East-West economic relations. Unfortunately, present 
trends of both factors seem to favour the more disruptive scenarios of 
the ex-USSR’s participation in international economic affairs.
The present Russian government has totally associated itself with 
neo-liberal approaches and with the shock therapy prescriptions 




























































































degree this reflects a strong desire to demonstrate an unequivocal 
rupture with previous practices, with any conscious and targeted state 
intervention into the economy. On the other hand this reflects an 
absence (up to the events of August 1991) of any comprehensive socio­
economic programme of the opposition to Gorbachev and of its 
unpreparedness to take power.
The policies pursued by the present Russian government and the 
advice given by international institutions tends to drastically shrink 
internal purchasing power in the country. Price liberalization (in a 
continuing monopolistic framework with prevalence of state-owned 
enterprises) has led to a fifteen to twenty fold increase in consumer 
prices, supplemented by a tangible cut in free and subsidized social 
services. The vast majority of the population was compensated only by 
a three to five times increase in monetary wages. Accordingly a very big 
shift in consumption patterns has taken place. This is practically 
destroying (if not wiping out) many internal consumer markets and 
leading to a marginalization of numerous key industries. The final result 
of this process is twofold. On the one hand an increasing number of 
people cannot buy the bare necessities of life and there is growing need 
for humanitarian aid to many areas of the former Soviet Union. On the 
other hand many consumer goods industries are losing their internal 
markets and are feverishly trying to reorient their activities to external 
markets, be they in the West or in developing countries. A comparison 
of data for the first quarter of 1991 and 1992 shows that there has been 
in many branches of consumer goods industries a two- three- and 
sometimes four- fold increase in the share of exports at the cost of the 
internal market.
A policy of de facto lifting of some foreign exchange restrictions has 
led to an undisputed undervaluation of the rouble, which in its turn is 
very actively fostering an outward orientation of economic activities. 
Sales for hard currency at one-fifth (or even less) of the prevailing 
world price still brings the producer a handsome profit and gives him 
the possibility of comfortably continuing production. Anyone who has 
anything to sell abroad, does so. Profits are such that entrepreneurs will 
not stop at anything to export. This leads to numerous malpractices, 
corruption and, mafia-type operations.
The increasing debt burden is another major factor in the outward 
orientation of the former USSR. Prevailing policies are evoking in­
creased opposition in the population and in political circles. The latter 
reflects a growing apprehension of prominent statesmen and scientists 
about the priorities and economic rational of the present economic 




























































































power, which (in a situation of persistent monopoly structures) is 
undermining the existing life support system of society and leading to 
the curtailment of many vital industries, distorting efficiency criteria, 
precluding any possibility of industrial conversion, without setting in 
motion any tangible new constructive mechanism of stimulating econo­
mic recovery and development. Such a policy is increasingly oriented on 
foreign assistance and complies with its conditionality.
The attitude of the West towards events in the former USSR are to 
a large extent conditioned by the prevailing Bretton Woods framework 
of thinking. The theoretical basis of this framework is economic neo­
liberalism, slightly modified and reoriented by the experience of half a 
century of foreign aid policies.
The basic assumption is that markets (once they are given a free 
scope in a country) can and will bring about benevolent changes, 
curtailing economic backwardness, poverty and hunger and create an 
efficient foundation for future development. As such it very often 
served as an instrument of overcoming various forms of protection and 
installing a free trade system. In practice the Bretton Woods system 
always had a very large component of aid and credits and therefore was 
constantly skewed towards questions of a country’s creditworthiness, its 
capacity to repay loans, its external economic status.
The Bretton Woods system was conceived as a regime regulating 
economic relations primarily between developed countries, with more 
or less equal levels of development. Moreover it was installed in a 
context of post 1945 conditions when a strong democratic movement 
influenced the whole situation in Europe, establishing a favourable 
climate for social security, reasonable wages and a sufficient purchasing 
power of the population to generate an internally oriented development 
process. If any help was needed in this respect, it was given by the 
communist threat from the East which moderated any encroachments 
that could have been made on living standards and purchasing power 
in Western Europe at that time. Various economic and political forces 
tended to reinforce a balance between productivity growth and wage 
levels. In these circumstances the question of the main directions of 
development (including the problem of inward or outward oriented 
development) did not arise; or to be more exact arose only in one 
dimension — should development be in a pro-communist or an anti­
communist context. To a certain degree the existence of this dilemma 
stimulated a more balanced approach with adequate emphasis on in­
ternal issues. The Bretton Woods rules were applied with numerous 
exemptions and the need to take account of internal situations and 




























































































stances could deal primarily with external aspects of development. It 
created numerous useful instruments for future aid programmes — 
conditionality, counterpart funds etc. But it also established a conceptu­
al framework in which development activities had a strong outward bias.
Such a neo-liberal approach (which was to some extent understand­
able and justifiable in relations between countries at a similar level of 
development) were later transplanted to relations between developed 
and developing countries but without adequate modification. It was 
supposed that the market would bulldoze an optimal solution irrespec­
tive of the concrete conditions prevailing in a country. This approach 
faltered on two accounts. The market could not cope with a totally 
different socio-cultural environment; the deeply entrenched value 
systems and traditional structures could only partially be transformed 
under the impact of modernizing forces. The distorted, meagre internal 
markets that were thus created could not serve as a basis for an 
adequate new life support system in these societies. By international 
standards most of the productive apparatus in developing countries was 
uncompetitive and in a free market situation was doomed to extinction. 
Moreover the existing local potential (capital, labour force, entrepre­
neurial skills etc.) under constant competitive pressure from outside 
could not organize itself into any alternative life support system. Hence 
the deep crisis in the developing world. Foreign aid was directed to a 
few specific areas and could not fill all the gaps that were thus created. 
What’s more, there exists a tradition in aid policy to accord special 
attention to the external payments aspects of a country’s situation; inter 
alia, economic policies give special preferences to measures that 
stimulated export orientation. In the smaller countries the emerging 
problems could to some degree be solved by various forms of integra­
tion into the world economy. But the larger countries (unless they could 
put up a fight in defence of their specific internal interests) were 
doomed to problems of dualistic structures and constantly deteriorating 
socio-economic conditions.
Thus a certain pattern of foreign aid and development assistance 
evolved which did not give high priority to the internal specifics of other 
countries, but concentrated more on the external aspects and the 
prospects of outward orientation in an economy. Such a narrow econo­
mic approach more often than was thwarted by the non-economic — 
political, social, cultural, environmental — aspects of development (since 
the purely economic questions were usually dealt with by sufficient 
financial injections).
This heritage defined the first stages of Western approaches to the 




























































































previously the West had to deal consecutively with various small and 
medium-size countries, now it has to devise a policy in relation to a big 
group of countries, who are entering a transition period more or less 
simultaneously. This means that a new factor must be taken into 
account — what will be the impact on the world economy of a simulta­
neous application of previous policies to a big group of countries with 
a tangible economic potential. One could have expected that these 
questions would be widely and seriously discussed at the earliest 
possible moment. But this unfortunately did not happen.
Even now, no seriously elaborated concept or internationally discus­
sed programme of integrating the former Soviet economy into the world 
market exists. Policy-makers and entrepreneurs in Russia are told to 
create conditions conducive to market formation, lower costs, decrease 
wages, modernize technology. All this in a situation of shrinking internal 
markets and a preponderance of saturated markets in the West. 
Moreover, there is, up to now, little hope of any negotiated multi-stage 
approach to future integration, comparable, say, to the methods 
adopted by the EEC in relation to Spain, Portugal, Greece. Foreign 
participation in solving the economic problems of the former USSR is 
mostly limited to financial aid in quite evidently insufficient quantities.
Given this situation, all that can be expected are wildcat exports and 
other methods of gaining hard currency at any and all costs. In such an 
all-out competitive struggle, the entrepreneurs from the former Soviet 
Union have several evident advantages. They are starting with extremely 
low wage levels and a comparatively docile labour force. Previous social 
security measures and policies are being dismantled very quickly. The 
entrepreneurs and managers themselves (many of them previous direc­
tors of enterprises in a planned economy) have a big experience in 
surviving in stress conditions, of evading legal barriers, finding uncon­
ventional solutions to unpredictable problems. Existing exchange rates 
give them a very wide margin of manoeuvre. They dispose of a very 
formidable natural resource base. All this augurs very destructive and 
painful competitive struggles with devastating repercussions on social 
conditions both in the East and in the West.
In these circumstances both the former countries of the Soviet Union 
and the countries of the West ought surely to be interested in a minimal 
disintegration of existing economic ties of CIS countries and in the 
adoption by them of maximum inward-looking development strategies. 
Only such an approach could cushion the negative consequences of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union on the world economy. The short­
term profits that could be reaped by some groups are incomparable with 




























































































outward-oriented development were to unfold rapidly in Russia (as well 
as in other members of the CIS). Up to now, however, the West has 
made practically no special effort to counter the economic disintegration 
of the former USSR or to stimulate the growth of the internal market.
Conclusions
The first conclusion is that the conceptual framework for a viable long­
term strategy of transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy has not been worked out. The methods of market formation, 
and the overall development policies, which are emerging today in 
Russia could easily become counterproductive, could give rise to 
fundamentalist backlashes, stimulate separatist movements, and wipe out 
many achievements of perestrojka. In such unstable conditions “progress 
towards the market” (especially if it is measured by speed criteria) will 
not have the positive effects that are expected. The market will not 
create a stimulus for increasing production (let alone efficient produc­
tion). The negative aspects of market formation may become a basis for 
socio-political upheavals which will preclude future development on a 
democratic market basis.
There is an urgent need for a better understanding by the West of 
the internal situation and of the specific problems of the former USSR 
and of the existing interactions between the economic, political, social, 
cultural and ideological processes taking place, and of the difficult 
choices that have to be made. It is imperative to acknowledge that there 
are no quick and easy solutions and that the shock therapy approach 
will not work in conditions when previous development precludes 
spontaneous market reaction and when the major task is structural 
transformation and the overcoming of large-scale gaps and dispropor­
tions at the macro and micro economic levels. Such a transformation 
will take time and will necessitate a well-thought-out strategy of 
sophisticated state intervention and participation. Assistance in 
elaborating such a strategy and in better understanding of the problems 
involved could be much more productive than an additional sum of 
economic aid.
The second conclusion is that existing methods of market formation 
in Russia are jeopardizing the future legitimacy of any market relations 
that could evolve (and in a worst scenario could provoke a dangerous 
backlash). It is therefore imperative to canalize this process into more 
civilized and socially acceptable forms. Of primary importance in this 




























































































tice, fraud, corruption and the unrestricted abuse of political power with 
pecuniary aims. A major component should also be a serious review of 
present economic policies and practices with the aim of excluding 
elements (e.g. the dismantling of the social security system) which in the 
future will diminish the public acceptance of market relations and of 
private property institutions. A key factor in the present situation is the 
elaboration of a socially acceptable approach to the whole privatization 
process. This warrants a special large-scale intellectual input and in 
some cases could be the object of relevant financial aid initiatives and 
conditionality. If serious progress in this area is not forthcoming, the 
legitimacy and stability of market relations in Russia will constantly be 
in question.
Thirdly, a first priority issue is the food problem. This necessitates a 
fundamental agrarian reform, allowing greater freedom of economic 
activity to all links in the food production-distribution chain. Given the 
stubborn resistance that land privatization evokes in Russia, it might be 
in some cases more efficient, as a first step to liberalize the leasing of 
land and of major links in the food distribution chain. A major issue is 
also that of increasing storage and conservation capacities. In all these 
areas foreign assistance could be very useful and could promise quick 
results.
Fourthly, given the major role of the military-industrial complex in the 
economic structure of the former USSR, it is imperative to work out a 
comprehensive programme of conversion of at least most of this com­
plex not just to civilian, but primarily to market-oriented production. 
Such a programme must encompass both economic and technological 
aspects and cover most of the sectors, not just those bits and pieces, 
that are at present perceived by the West to be most threatening. It 
would seem appropriate that a much larger share of Western economic 
aid should be directed to these aims. If such a programme is not 
forthcoming the well organized and influential military-industrial 
complex might easily become actively antagonistic to the reforms in 
progress and opt for a return to pre-perestrojka conditions and 
international policies. This constitutes at present one of the biggest 
dangers to international security.
Fifth, there is an urgent need to acknowledge that outward-oriented 
development can play only a marginal role in the solution of Russia’s 
problems and that the major effort should be devoted to developing the 
internal market. The overriding aim should be not just any market at 
any cost, but a stable, legitimate market, capable of stimulating 
production and satisfying the major part of the country’s needs. This 




























































































tivity growth, renovation and modernization of the major production 
chains, a fostering of retraining facilities, a stimulation of internal 
purchasing power and a lessening of income inequalities. A higher prior­
ity should be attributed to an optimal interaction between the internal 
and the external market. The existing pull of the external market is 
severing vital internal economic ties, accelerating the fall in production 
and could have dangerously disruptive consequences for the internation­
al economy. In the present jockeying for political positions and the 
struggle against the economic crisis the longer-term objectives of 
increased productivity and a more equal distribution of incomes should 
not be lost. A more realistic time horizon for the convertibility of the 
rouble has to be adopted. Strict regulation of outward-oriented activities 
and foreign exchange transactions would be in the longer term interests 
of both Russia and the West.
Sixth, a new conceptual framework has to be worked out to help 
Russia find its place in the world economy and get the maximum effects 
from its external economic relations. The convergence of market 
formation and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union is pushing 
Russia (together with the other CIS countries) into a very dangerous 
stance, when these countries are increasingly becoming outward- 
oriented and are forced to strive for any and all forms of competitive­
ness. Their major advantages in the present situation are the low level 
of wages (inherited from the GULAG system), abundant natural 
resources, a shaky system of governance and very loose property rights 
and responsibilities. This creates especially favourable conditions for 
large-scale dumping and other economically-aggressive expansionist 
practices. If left to themselves these tendencies might acquire very 
dangerous and disruptive dimensions for the world economy.
The main safeguard against this is the fostering of more inward- 
oriented development strategies in Russia, Ukraine, Kazahkstan and 
some other CIS countries. But the integration of these countries into 
the world economy constitutes a major problem in its own right; its 
solution should be seen as a bilaterally controlled process. On the one 
hand the CIS countries should have an operative strategy, defining the 
role of external economic relations in their overall development effort, 
their priorities and possibilities. On the other hand the Western coun­
tries must define the concrete scope, form and methods of integrating 
the former USSR into the world economy, which they consider accept­
able and which they are ready to foster. An unregulated, unnegotiated, 
free market solution of this problem will be extremely costly and 
disruptive for both sides. The level of wages in Russia and other former 




























































































impinge on the existing social framework in the West (even leaving 
aside the use of mafia-type institutions and practices). In the final 
analysis an all-out unregulated, unnegotiated, competitive struggle of the 
former USSR for a place in the world economy will in no way be 
conducive either to world security or to a rational and durable 
international division of labour.
Seventh and last, given the embryonic state of market relations in the 
former USSR (and the new problems created by the disintegration of 
this country), it is more than doubtful that the traditional sequence of 
economic integration is applicable or even desirable here. With the 
existing industrial structures, price discrepancies and distorted foreign 
exchange rates any lowering of external trade barriers will inevitably 
have very little real impact. Accordingly another sequence of integrating 
the former USSR into the world economy seems more plausible. This 
would lay more stress (in the primary stages) on coordination and har­
monization in the environmental and social fields. Specific agreements 
in this area could be viewed by both East and West as a commitment 
to further integration in the future. At the same time such agreements 
could reduce the threat that the former USSR countries will attempt to 
achieve international competitiveness not so much through the moderni­
zation of their productive apparatus as by measures depressing wage 
costs and living standards. The already emerging trend in CIS countries 
towards lowering social and environmental standards could constitute 
a real danger to cohesion and modernized development in the West — 
through increased migration pressures, reorientation of foreign invest­
ment inflows, unfair competition, to say nothing of unpredictable socio­
political upheavals. Another fruitful area of cooperation and future 
integration are the possibilities of joint scientific research and active 
Western participation in conversion programmes.
Moreover, because of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, 
Russia has suddenly become a semi-land-locked country. Hence the spe­
cial importance for her of the creation of a single European economic 
space with a minimum of transport and trade barriers. More broadly 
speaking Russia because of her new situation is now much more inter­
ested in a viable and efficient system of regulating international 
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